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CASE COMMENTS
court did not infer a condition subsequent, and their finding is in har-
mony with the usual rules of construction for conditions subsequent.
CLARENCE CORNELIUS.
CONTRACTS NOT TO COMPETE WITHIN A CERTAIN AREA
WITHOUT A PROVISION FOR AN EXPRESS SALE
OF GOOD WILL
As a part of the contract by which he sold his hospital in Floyd
County to the plaintiffs, the defendant agreed not to own or operate a
hospital in that county for ten years. Under the same agreement he
assigned to the plaintiffs hospitalization contracts with the county and
a labor union, together with his good will. Within two years he erected
another hospital in Knott County, three hundred yards from the Floyd
County line. Many of the defendant's former patients, residing in
Floyd County, began to patronize his new hospital instead of that of
the plaintiffs. The latter sought to enjoin the defendant from receiving
these former patients on the ground that he was breaching his contract
not to compete with the plaintiffs in Floyd County. The lower court
enjoined the defendant from receiving the patients covered by the
assigned contracts, but refused to enjoin him from receiving any other
patients. This decision was reversed upon appeal and the defendant
was enjoined from receiving at his hospital, for the remainder of the
ten year period, any patients from Floyd County.'
By the contract there was an express sale of good will as to the
assigned contracts, but mention was not made of a sale of the good will
of the hospital. Nevertheless, the sale of a business includes an implied
transfer of good will, though there is no stipulation to that effect in the
contract.2 The only effect of this implied sale of good will is to raise
an obligation on the part of the seller not to derogate from his grant by
directly interfering with the business which he has sold to the
purchaser.3
However, this obligation does not extend so far as to preclude the
transferor from opening up a new business in competition with that of
the purchaser. While he could not directly interfere with the business
that he has sold to the purchaser by soliciting his old customers, he
could Indirectly interfere with it by dealing with them when they came
to him of their own accord.' That was what the defendant did here.
Since it was not alleged that the defendant solicited any of his former
customers or did anything else that would amount to a direct inter-
'Johnson et al. v. Stumb et al., 277 Ky. 301, 126 S. W. (2d) 165
(1938).
2 Johnson v. Bruzek, 142 Minn. 454, 172 N. W. 700 (1909). See
Madox v. Fuller, 173 So. 12, 14 (Ala. 1937); 5 Williston on
Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1937), sec. 1640.
'5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1937), sec. 1640.4 Ibid.
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ference with the business that he has sold, the principles covering an
implied sale of good will are opposed to the decree of the upper court.
The defendant agreed not to own or operate a hospital in Floyd
County. This provision was Inserted in the contract to enable the
plaintiffs to operate a hospital without the competition of a hospital
conducted by the defendant in Floyd County. The effect of this con-
tract not to compete is to supplement the protection given the pur-
chaser by the implied sale of good will.
Contracts not to compete are strictly construed.* The reason for
such strict construction is to prevent the extension of contracts, the
natural effect of which is to restrain trade and personal liberty, beyond
their fair import.7 The effect of the decree of the appellate court was
to give an extremely liberal construction to the contract. By the terms
of that contract the defendant agreed not to own or operate a hospital
In Floyd County.8 He did not agree that he would not own or operate
a hospital in any county other than Floyd County. He did not say in
the contract that if he did operate a hospital in another county, he
would refuse to accept patients from Floyd County. If the plaintiffs
had desired to protect their practice from the competition of the defend-
ant wherever his hospital was located, they might have Inserted a pro-
vision to that effect in the contract. The liability of construction given
the contract in the instant case has little support.9 Moreover, the effect
5 See Johnson et al. v. Stumbo et al., 277 Ky. 301, 126 S. W. (2d)
165, 168 (1938).
*Haldeman v. Simonton, 55 Iowa 144, 7 N. W. 483 (1880); State
ex rel. Youngmai v. Calhoun, 231 S. W. 647 (Mo. App. 1921); McCarty
v. Constable, 221 App. Div. 307, 223 N. Y. Supp. 484 (1927) (The promi-
sor made an unsolicited sale to a resident of the forbidden area at his
store); Thomas v. Miles, 3 Ohio St. 274 (1854) (The promisor was
allowed to supply customers in Ohio from his business in New Ybrk,
when he had agreed not to conduct this business in Ohio); Raub v.
Van Horn, 133 Pa. 573, 19 Atl. 704 (1890) (Under the promisor's agree-
ment not to resume his practice at a certain town, he was allowed to
receive patients from there at another town, six miles away); Midland
Lumber & Coal Co. v. Roesler, 203 Wis. 129, 233 N. W. 614 (1930) (A
sale to a resident of the prohibited area at the promisor's lumber yard
and a delivery of the goods inside that area for the customer's accom-
modation was held not to be doing business in that area in violation of
the contract).
See Haldeman v. Simonton, 55 Iowa 144, 7 N. W. 493, 494 (1880).
sSee Johnson et al. v. Stumbo et al., 277 Ky. 301, 126 S. W. (2d)
165, 168 (1938).
9 See Skaggs v. Simpson, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 410, 110 S. W. 251 (1908).
This case may possibly be distinguished on the ground that the promi-
sor started his business anew just outside the limits of the city where
he had agreed not to practice. This is such a minor distinction, hcw-
ever, that it is doubtful that it would prevent the Skaggs case from
being in point and supporting the decision in the Stumbo case. The
other cases which are cited in support of it are not in point. Elkins v.
Barclay, 243 Ky. 144, 47 S. W. (2d) 945 (1932) is not in point, for in
that case the promisor entered the territory in which he had agreed not
to compete and there performed burial services. This violated the
express terms of the contract by which the promisor agreed not to
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of the decree is to unduly restrict the people of Floyd County in their
free choice of hospitalization.1 0
E. R. WEBB
CONTRACTS-IS A NEW AMORTIZATION PLAN FOR PAY-
MENT OF A MORTGAGE CONTRACT A NOVATION
IN KENTUCKY?
A stockholder in an insolvent national farm loan association sought
payment of the face value of his stock. A mortgage contract between
the stockholder and the association had been made in 1926 as a colidi-
tion precedent to a loan granted by the Federal Land Bank of Louis-
ville.' Subsequent to amendment of the Farm Loan Act in 1933 a new
agreement had been made which stipulated that the unpaid amount of
indebtedness should be repaid on an amortization plan. Plaintiff con-
tended, inter alia, that by reason of the "new contract" his liability as
a stockholder should be determined by the provisions of the amend-
ment. The court denied recovery, holding that the amendment relied
on applied only to contracts, debts or engagements of the association
entered into after 1933. The court further stated that the new agree-
compete with the promissee in that county. Kochenrath v. Christman,
180 Ky. 799, 203 S. W. 738 (1918) is not in point, for there the promisor
set up a business in the forbidden territory and could not have violated
the provisions of the contract more flagrantly. Gutzeit v. Strader, 158
Ky. 131, 164 S. W. 318 (1918) is not in point, for in that case the promi-
sor had operated a business in the forbidden territory by means of a
dummy corporation. This amounted to a violation of the express terms
of the contract. Foxworth-Galbraith Lumber Co. v. Turner, 121 Tex.
177, 46 S. W. (2d) 663 (1932) is distinguishable. There the promisor
did considerable solicitation in the territory in which he had agreed
not to compete, which might amount to doing business there according
to the dictum of Midland Lumber Co. v. Roessler, 203 Wis. 129, 233
N. W. 614, 616 (1930).
(1939) 38 Mich. Law Rev. 242, 244.
One desiring to borrow money from a Federal Land Bank must
become a shareholder in the Farm Loan Association; as such a share-
holder, prior to 1933, he was individually responsible, not only for the
amount represented by his shares, but in addition thereto to the extent
of the amount of stock owned by him at its par value. See Byrne v.
Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 61 N. D. 265, 237 N. W. 797 (1931).
However, in 1933 the Farm Loan Act was amended to read: ". . . the
shareholders of national farm loan associations shall not be held indi-
vidually responsible for any contract, debt, or engagement of such
association entered into after June 16, 1933". (Italics added.)
12 U. S. C. A. sec. 744a. Thus if, and only if, the new agreement dis-
charged and took the place of the existing loan contract it was a "con-
tract, debt, or engagement of such association entered into after
June 16, 1933". The purpose of the amendment is not entirely clear.
If it contemplated a different degree of liability for all who became
stockholders after 1933, then the court's concern as to a novation, or
new contract, was unnecessary. If it is to be construed literally to
apply to contracts made after 1933, it must be decided whether the new
agreement novated the old.
K. L. J.-8
